








ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge  








ESRC Centre for Business Research 
University of Cambridge 
The Judge Institute of Management Blding 
Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 1223 765323 


















This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance, Contracts and Incentives. 
 
    
Abstract 
A number of recent national and EU initiatives have sought explicitly to 
encourage innovative firms and venture capital finance. In keeping with the 
policy debate, this paper focuses explicitly on the role of law and lawyers in 
facilitating venture capital: that is, both supply by investors, and demand by 
entrepreneurs. It reviews existing literature in a way that seeks to clarify the 
links between law and legal institutions and the facilitation of venture capital 
finance, identifies open research questions and suggests a number of 
hypotheses. As such, it forms the first part of a wider study which will seek to 
test these hypotheses.  
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Introduction 
 
Venture capital is used to finance a small minority of companies with the 
potential and ambition to grow rapidly. It is thought to be of disproportionate 
importance in stimulating innovation. Start-up companies with new business 
ideas and high growth potential, but lacking liquid assets, may be unable to 
obtain bank finance because of the high risk they present. Venture capital 
involves the supply of equity finance—so the investor shares in the benefits of 
high growth—alongside ‘hands-on’ governance so as to assist in bringing about 
the success of such companies.  
 
Venture capital investment differs widely from country to country, both in terms 
of the aggregate sums invested and the way in which the venture capitalists 
structure their relations with investee companies. In keeping with the 
comparative program of much recent corporate finance scholarship, how to 
account for these differences is an important question for positive social 
science. It is also a question that has considerable interest for policy makers. A 
number of recent national and EU initiatives have sought explicitly to encourage 
innovative firms and venture capital finance. For example, the European 
Commission’s Risk Capital Action Plan is designed to stimulate this type of 
activity throughout Member States (European Commission, 1998; 2000a). The 
UK Government has set itself the goal of making Britain the ‘best place in the 
world to start and grow a business’ (SBS, 2001a: 3). The stimulation of the 
market for venture capital will clearly play an important part in this process, and 
an understanding of the determinants of venture capital investment is of obvious 
importance in achieving this objective.  
 
This chapter reviews evidence about the extent to which law and lawyers 
‘matter’ for venture capital investment. As such, it relates both to the policy 
debate about financing innovative firms and more generally to the comparative 
finance literature that has investigated the extent to which law may be one of the 
determinants of differing patterns of corporate finance across various countries. 
The review is organised around the idea that law may ‘matter’ in a variety of 
ways for corporate finance. The starting point is a model of what venture capital 
investment involves, derived from empirical studies in the US. The venture 
capitalist is a financial intermediary, who raises funds from end-investors which 
are then used to finance small entrepreneurial firms. The contracts between the 
venture capitalist and the investee firms have complex terms which can be 
understood as responses to agency problems inherent in the financing 
relationship. The first way in which laws may ‘matter’ is by affecting the way in 
which the practice of venture capital investment is structured—most obviously, 
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in the terms of the contracts used. Empirical studies of the contracting practices 
of venture capitalists show clear differences between national practices, and it is 
plausible that some at least of these may be driven by differences in the legal 
regimes. Most obviously, these might arise due to mandatory legal rules—for 
example, local tax laws—which distort choices of inframarginal investors in 
favour of a particular type of financial contract. 
 
A related possibility is that the variety in contracting practices is partly caused 
by learning externalities in the market for contract terms. These could arise 
wherever the costs of contract drafting make it economic to rely on ‘standard 
forms’ which are customised in individual cases. Once a particular form has 
been used, it may be cheaper for lawyers negotiating a similar transaction 
simply to apply the terms used the first time rather than to start again from 
scratch. As a given set of terms is used over and over, familiarity with its 
contents will spread, in time becoming acquired by judges called upon to decide 
its meaning. These factors can give rise to situations where contract terms are 
chosen not for their intrinsic merit, but simply because the learning and network 
costs of using an ‘unusual’ term would outweigh the benefits. Term choice is 
then said to be ‘path dependent’, because what determines the outcome is not 
their current relative usefulness, but the historical reasons for the original 
selection. Empirical studies show that venture capital contracts are written by 
lawyers who customise and apply standard terms. Path dependencies created by 
the use of such standards might give rise to differences in contracting practices 
between legal systems. The meaning of contract terms is likely only to arise for 
consideration by lawyers qualified in the jurisdiction of their governing law, and 
hence learning and network benefits are likely to be limited to a particular 
jurisdiction—implying differences in terms used from one legal system to 
another, but less so within a given legal system. 
 
Laws may also ‘matter’ for the aggregate levels of venture capital investment. 
At the margins, distortions introduced by mandatory rules can be expected to 
lead to more or less investment in aggregate. Such rules may by affect either 
investors’ willingness to supply venture capital finance, or entrepreneurs’ 
demand for such finance. From a policy perspective, demand-side factors such 
as the taxation of entrepreneurs’ returns or the potential consequences of 
personal bankruptcy are probably much more important for stimulating 
innovative businesses than factors which affect the supply-side. This is because 
investors’ funds can travel across borders much more readily than can 
entrepreneurs. Thus if domestic laws—for example, pension fund regulations—
inhibit domestic investors, entrepreneurs may still be able to raise finance from 
overseas investors whose jurisdictions do not impose such restrictions. 
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However, overseas investors from such ‘supply friendly’ jurisdictions will not 
invest in domestic firms unless there is demand from local entrepreneurs. Thus 
for policymakers seeking to foster innovative firms, measures which stimulate 
demand are likely to produce a greater return on reform energies than changes 
designed to foster supply.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part I considers the way in which 
law and legal institutions may affect the content of the VC-portfolio company 
relation. It is striking that the financial contracts used in US VC investment 
agreements seem to be uniquely homogeneous, almost all making use of 
convertible preferred stock, whereas in other countries for which data are 
available, terms tend to be much more diverse. This does not appear to be 
driven by any evolution towards the ‘best’ terms in the US, but rather is likely 
to be the result of aspects of US law, and possibly learning externalities 
generated amongst the close-knit community of VC lawyers.  
 
Part II then describes how the incidence of venture capital finance differs across 
countries. Consideration is paid in Part III to a range of mandatory rules of law 
which may affect the incidence of venture capital finance. In each case, the 
enquiry proceeds first by hypothesising how the relevant rules may affect the 
practice of venture capital investment as described in the model. These are 
categorised according to whether the posited effect will be on the supply of 
venture capital—i.e. willingness to invest—or the demand—i.e. the creation of 
entrepreneurial projects or the attractiveness of venture capital finance. After the 
hypotheses are identified, relevant evidence is reviewed and UK developments 
are considered. Part IV considers the impact of cross-border movements of 
funds, and in so doing seeks to sort the potentially relevant variables into some 
sort of hierarchy to assist a policy-maker in deciding which may be the most 
urgent issues to address. Part V is a brief conclusion. 
 
I. How Might Law Affect the Practice of Venture Capital Investment? 
 
A. Terms in VC Investment Agreements 
 
‘Start-up’ firms developing new technologies commonly do not generate steady 
cash flows which can be used to make interest payments on debt. By contrast, 
their cash flows are often negative, with large sums being ‘burnt’ in order first 
to develop a product and second to grow the market. This leads to a long lag-
time before any repayment to investors can be made. Furthermore, the extreme 
uncertainty associated with developing new technologies makes it difficult to 
predict how much return (if any) will be generated. These factors make debt 
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investment unsuitable, as the ‘upside’ returns are fixed by the rate of interest 
charged (Bank of England, 2001), and at very high interest rates an ‘adverse 
selection’ problem would emerge (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). A second problem 
for start-ups seeking debt finance is that many lack liquid assets. The key 
feature of debt that allows the financial contract to work is the ability of the 
financier to take control of the assets should default occur which makes credible 
their threat to enforce in bad states (Hart, 1995). However, the value (if any) of 
a start-up firm will inhere in the ideas—the ‘human capital’ of the entrepreneur, 
and their opportunities for growth, which are not amenable to enforcement by 
an investor. 
 
Through their specialist knowledge, venture capitalists are able to add value 
through ‘active monitoring’ of the firm’s business operation, as well as financial 
backing (Black and Gilson, 1998). The terms on which VCs are willing to invest 
are thought by financial economists to play a crucial role in maximising the 
benefits of the investment.
1 They respond to the same information asymmetry 
concerns as debt contracts, but are adapted to the context of the start-up firm 
with few liquid assets. The terms used in US investment agreements have been 
investigated empirically (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2000), and 
their structure is now fairly well understood. 
 
Finance is not advanced all at once, but rather is ‘staged’. Subsequent ‘rounds’ 
of finance may not be available, or only on considerably more expensive terms, 
if performance targets are not met in the interim. This process gives the venture 
capitalist control rights over the decision whether or not to continue the project. 
Instead of pulling assets out of a firm (default on debt) the venture capitalist 
simply refuses to put more assets in.  In either case, the denial of assets leads to 
closure of the firm’s business.  
 
Venture capitalists typically take preferred shares, usually convertible on 
demand into ordinary shares, whereas the entrepreneur takes ‘plain’ ordinary 
shares. Conversion by the VC will of course remove the liquidation preference, 
and so will only be done where the portfolio company is doing well. Investment 
agreements usually provide for automatic conversion on a successful IPO.  
 
Investment agreements usually also provide for a range of control rights to be 
given to the venture capitalist. The venture capitalist can arrange for their 
preferred shares to carry enhanced voting rights in the general meeting, usually 
by providing that they can be voted on an ‘as-converted’ basis. If a controlling 
stake is accorded, this will entitle them to remove the members of the board of 
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directors. The venture capitalist can demand entitlements to appoint directors to 
the board.  
 
It is impossible for the entrepreneur to alienate her human capital. However, by 
making greater cash flow rights vest over time, the entrepreneur can be ‘locked 
in’ to the business. This is typically achieved through option vesting schemes, 
whereby the executives are given options to purchase stock provided that they 
remain with the firm for a fixed period. Furthermore, entrepreneurs usually also 
sign covenants not to compete, which apply should they cease to work for the 
firm. 
 
Whilst a good deal is known about the standard terms used in US VC 
investment agreements, many more questions have yet to be answered. One 
particularly troublesome issue is that the theoretical explanations do not fully 
explain why convertible preferred stock appears to be the financial contract of 
choice. The indeterminacy has two aspects. On the one hand, the liquidation 
priority it affords is unlikely to be of much value to venture capitalists, for the 
same reason as debt finance is inappropriate. A typical start-up firm will have 
few liquid assets and therefore the returns from liquidation, if the ‘downside’ 
outcome eventuates, will be small. Thus it is unclear why the VC does not 
simply take ordinary stock (Bratton, 2001; Gilson and Schizer, 2002). On the 
other hand, in cases where the assets do have some downside value, and 
liquidation priority may be worth taking, theoretical accounts of the value of 
convertability do not distinguish between convertible debt and preferred equity 
(e.g. Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; Repullo and Suarez, 1998; Hellmann, 2000; 
Schmidt, 2001). Thus we might expect in some cases to see convertible debt, 
and in others ordinary equity. Yet convertible preferred is the instrument of 
choice in the US. 
  
A number of studies have also been done of the financial contracts employed in 
venture capital investments outside the US. In none of these are convertible 
preferred stock found to be ubiquitous in the same way. Bascha and Walz 
(2001) find that convertible preferred is only used in a small subset of German 
venture capital investment agreements, as does Cumming (2000) in respect of 
Canadian VC contracts, and Cumming (2002) in respect of contracts taken from 
a range of European countries. Furthermore, Cumming (2001) finds that US 
VCs who invest in Canadian start-up companies do not use convertible 
preferred stock with anything like the frequency observed in their US 
investments. Rather, each of these studies found a heterogeneous mix of 
financial instruments were used in their samples—including ordinary shares, 
preference shares, and convertible debt. The next two subsections consider 
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whether these differences are in whole or in part explicable by reference to 
varying domestic legal rules, or the practices of lawyers in particular 
jurisdictions. It seems likely that ‘law matters’ here in the sense of being able to 
determine the contents of financial contracts.  
 
B. The Role of Law 
 
There are several possible explanations for the international differences in 
financial contracts revealed by the empirical literature. Nor are these accounts 
necessarily mutually exclusive. The first story is that a Darwinian process of 
‘survival of the fittest’ is occurring, whereby terms gradually evolve towards the 
optimal financial instrument—in this case, the convertible preferred share 
favoured by US VCs for their domestic investments. The reason that contracting 
practices in other jurisdictions differ is that their venture capital markets are less 
mature, and consequently the process of evolution has not yet progressed so far. 
This theory receives some support from the findings of Bascha and Walz 
(2001). In their sample, investments made by private venture capital funds 
employed more convertible instruments and more covenants than those made by 
public funds, suggesting that the latter were perhaps less well-incentivised to 
control the actions of their portfolio companies. However, this theory cannot 
recover from the problem that there is no satisfactory explanation for the posited 
superiority of convertible preferred stock over ordinary equity or (as the case 
may be) convertible debt. Furthermore, the idea that funds in the US are 
somehow further along a process of evolutionary development than those in 
other jurisdictions is flatly contradicted by the findings of Cumming (2001) that 
US funds do not use convertible preferred stock when investing in Canadian 
companies. If the Darwinian explanation were right, then it would be precisely 
these investors we should expect to see leading the dissemination of ‘better-
adapted’ terms.  
 
A second theory suggests that the ubiquity of convertible preferred as the 
financial contract of choice in the US is driven by regulatory or institutional 
constraints, as opposed to its innate efficiency. On this ‘law matters’ view, the 
evolution of US terms has been artificially curtailed. The normative implication 
is that convertible preferred may represent a laggard, as opposed to a leader, in 
an evolutionary race. Gilson and Schizer (2002) develop a tax-based 
explanation (first suggested in Sahlman (1990)) of the fact that US VCs rarely 
take ordinary shares in investee companies. They argue that the entrepreneur 
will usually take compensation in the form of shares. As start-ups rarely pay 
dividends, the entrepreneur will be unlikely to see any cash return until he 
eventually sells these shares, which typically he will not be permitted to do for a 
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number of years. Under the US federal tax regime, the value (at the date he 
receives them) of the entrepreneur’s shares will be taxed as income. The 
difference between this value and that which he obtains when he sells them will 
then be taxed—when it is eventually realised—as a capital gain. The 
entrepreneur will wish to ‘finesse’ matters so that as much as possible of his 
return is taxable as a capital gain. This is because marginal rates of CGT are 
much lower than for income tax, and because CGT is not payable until the 
realisation occurs whereas income tax is payable annually and may create 
liquidity problems for the entrepreneur. Thus to minimise income tax liability 
(and thereby increase the portion of his ultimate return which is assessable for 
CGT), the entrepreneur will wish to attribute as low a valuation as possible to 
the shares. Yet the entrepreneur will want to attribute as high a value as possible 
to shares taken by the venture capitalist so as to minimise dilution. This 
difficulty is finessed, for the benefit of the tax authorities, by issuing preferred 
stock to the venture capitalist and ordinary shares to the entrepreneur, each of 
which can be valued differently.  
 
A complementary explanation is given by Bratton (2001) for the non-
observance of convertible debt in US investment agreements. This is, he argues, 
because of fears of lender liability which might accompany a holding of debt. 
Under US corporate law, lenders who, as VCs do, become involved in making 
management decisions, may face direct liability to other creditors or even to 
shareholders should their decisions work out badly. This provides a significant 
disincentive to combining debt investment with active governance. These 
explanations could be tested by comparisons with the tax codes of other 
jurisdictions. In particular, in countries where capital gains tax liability is lower, 
or more substantial tests as to the valuation of shares are used, then it predicts 
that convertible preferred shares would be used less frequently, in favour of 
ordinary stock; and in countries with less stringent lender liability laws, we 
would expect to see more convertible debt. 
 
The evidence from other jurisdictions is not inconsistent with the predictions of 
the ‘law matters’ view. As has been noted, a much wider range of financial 
contracts are employed in virtually every other jurisdiction that has been studied 
apart from the US. To test these theories, it would be necessary to compare the 
relevant US laws with those in other jurisdictions where convertible preferred 
stock is not the financial contract of choice. Gilson and Schizer (2002) briefly 
consider the position in Canada, suggesting that it is unnecessary to create a 
separate class of stock to enable the manager to have entirety of his 
compensation assessable for CGT, rather than income tax. This is because the 
tax code does not treat stock or options received by entrepreneurs as income, 
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and allows their capital gains assessment to be at particularly favourable rates. 
A similar regime obtains in the UK, where since 1984, employees who are 
compensated with stock options will thereby incur no liability to income tax and 
no CGT until exercise, provided that the options were held for a specified 
period. This favourable treatment has since 1999 been extended in the guise of 
the ‘Enterprise Management Initiative’ (EMI), which allows ‘small, high-risk’ 
firms to offer options to employees which not only incur no income tax liability, 
but also no CGT liability until the sale of the shares. Under the UK system, 
there would appear to be no need for the sort of ‘finessing’ described by Gilson 
and Schizer, and hence if their explanation is valid, convertible preferred should 
not be the financial contract of choice for UK VCs. As yet, good evidence on 
this question is not available, although anecdotal accounts suggest a plurality of 
contracts are used.  
 
C. The Role of Lawyers 
 
A third possible explanation for the differences in financial contracts has to do 
with the role played by lawyers in designing contract terms. As we have seen, 
the legal structure of venture capital investments is something that is primarily 
contractual. This implies, therefore, that the lawyers who are involved in the 
design of the contracts may have a crucial role to play in facilitating venture 
capital finance. Gilson (1984) posits that, contrary to the popular myth that 
lawyers simply destroy value through adding an extra layer of costs, argues that 
business lawyers play a role of ‘transaction cost engineers’, adding value by 
structuring transactions in such a way as to facilitate parties’ reaching their 
desired outcomes. 
 
Qualitative studies of the services provided by Silicon Valley law firms suggest 
that these lawyers at least perceive themselves as offering benefits to their 
clients—principally high-tech local businesses—which are unavailable 
elsewhere. An initial study conducted by Friedman et al (1989) revealed that 
lawyers who advised ‘start-ups’ provided not only general legal advice, but 
often also more general business advice, and through their networks were able 
to broker meetings between their clients and venture capitalists, thus facilitating 
access to finance. The interviewees also described their approach as being 
geared towards finding the ‘work-around’ for any legal problem. They 
considered their transaction documentation to contain less verbiage than that of 
their Manhattan contemporaries, with the gaps in these incomplete contracts 
filled by norms of trust and reciprocity engendered by the fact that they, and 
both parties to the deal, were members of a relatively close-knit community in 
which reciprocity and reputation were important.  
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A more wide-ranging subsequent study elaborated upon these findings. 
Suchman and Cahill (1996) present interview evidence suggesting that Silicon 
Valley lawyers help to reduce the uncertainty experienced by participants to hi-
tech financing deals in a variety of ways. For example, Silicon Valley law firms 
are allegedly much more willing than their counterparts elsewhere to agree to 
defer billing until a start-up client has made revenues (effectively bearing the 
risk that it will never do so) or indeed to bill by taking equity in the client.
2  
Furthermore, these firms are willing to give opinion letters to allay venture 
capital investors’ due diligence concerns without undergoing the same level of 
scrutiny (because of the intense pressure of time) as counterpart firms elsewhere 
might do. In effect, the result is that the law firm provides insurance to the high-
tech client. 
 
Moreover, Silicon Valley law firms are the first ‘port of call’ for entrepreneurs 
seeking to obtain venture capital finance. The lawyers can investigate the 
entrepreneur’s quality, and reject those whose business plans are obviously 
unlikely to get funded. More importantly, they can act as a valuable 
intermediary by channelling clients towards VCs with preferences for particular 
types of project. In each case, the recommendation of the entrepreneur by a law 
firm with an interest in maintaining its reputation serves as a ‘bond’ of the 
quality of the client.
3  
 
A third way in which Suchman and Cahill identify lawyers as adding value is 
through ‘coaching’ clients about the norms of the venture capital community—
what to expect and what not to expect. This can reduce transaction costs by 
ensuring homogeneity of expectations, thereby minimising the likelihood that a 
dispute will break out. However, to the extent that VCs rely on the degree to 
which a potential investee is aware of community norms as a signal of quality, 
then coaching by law firms may be detrimental. Rock (2001) argues that VCs 
look favourably on potential investees who ‘know the rules of the game’ as this 
signals their seriousness of commitment. However, if law firms coach clients, 
then this reduces the cost to entrepreneurs of becoming informed, and hence the 
signal becomes noisier. 
 
Finally, Suchman and Cahill argue that the use of standardised terms helps 
reduce the transaction costs of negotiation in any individual deal. This seems 
intuitively plausible: whilst the hypothetical ‘best’ contract may require 
significant customisation to fit the needs of the parties ex post, this may not be 
the best where ex ante negotiation and drafting costs are included in the 
equation. It may be cheaper simply to use a ‘standard form’ which is understood 
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by, and therefore acceptable to, both sides. Furthermore, a standard form may 
be better understood by courts and therefore offer greater benefits of certainty of 
interpretation.  
 
Of all the apparently beneficial practices identified by Suchman and Cahill, the 
issue of standardisation of terms is perhaps most interesting in the context of 
venture capital finance. Whilst standardisation may generate savings, it is not 
necessarily optimal. Difficulties could arise where (i) there is a subset of firms 
for whom a different type of investment agreement would be preferable; or (ii) 
circumstances change such that the original standard terms are no longer the 
best ‘average’ fit to the requirements. In each case, the ‘network externalities’ 
which are created by the dominant term—i.e. the ease for lawyers of 
understanding, the ease of judicial interpretation, etc—and the fact that the full 
costs of moving from that network must be borne by the first party to do so—
will create a powerful impediment to change unless lawyers can co-ordinate on 
the design of a new set of terms (Kahan and Klausner, 1996; 1997).
 
Furthermore, Bernstein (1995) questions whether the terms are likely not also to 
be systematically redistributive in favour of VCs, who are repeat players, and 
away from entrepreneurs, who usually are not.  
 
To conclude this section, it is in principle possible that the ubiquity of 
convertible preferred stock in US investment agreements could be explicable by 
reference to the close-knit communities of lawyers advising high-tech firms, and 
their influence in standardising contracts. However, not enough is known about 
contracting practices in other jurisdictions to be able to say with any degree of 
confidence whether or not this is a significant influence. On the evidence 
presently available, the most promising theoretical explanation for the 
differences between financial contracts remains that legal rules matter for the 
terms of parties’ contracts. 
 
II. How Does the Incidence of Venture Capital Investment Vary Across 
Countries? 
 
The main sources of data on venture capital investment activity in different 
countries are the annual reports published by the trade associations, such as the 
NVCA in the US and EVCA in Europe. There are some difficulties in 
comparing the data, because of differences in measurement between 
associations, and even between years within a particular series of reports 
(Baygan and Freudenberg, 2000). These drawbacks notwithstanding, it is 
possible to illustrate several important trends by reference only to aggregated 
data.  
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First, venture capital investment is cyclical, and Graph 1 shows how early-stage 
funds invested rose during the late 1990s in both Europe and the US. As might 
be expected, 2001 has seen a sharp decline although this has been less 
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Secondly, the overall level of venture capital investment varies significantly 
from country to country. Graph 2 shows levels of early-stage investment in 
1998 and 2000 for a range of European countries and the US, divided by GDP 
so as to allow comparison in relation to the size of the economies. More than 
twice as much early-stage venture capital per million dollars of GDP is invested 
in the US than in any European country. Within Europe, the UK in 1998 ranked 
behind Germany, Finland, Ireland, and perhaps surprisingly, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The UK’s position had advanced within Europe by 2000, but in 
light of subsequent events this looks to be a ‘bubble year’, and so it is difficult 
to know how much reliance to place upon these data. The relative levels of early 
stage investment have themselves changed over time. During the mid 1980s, 
more early-stage venture capital was invested per million dollars of GDP in the 
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A third observation is that relative national levels of investment of later-stage 
private equity finance—i.e. expansion and buyouts—are quite different to those 
of early-stage venture capital. Graph 3 shows levels of expansion and buyout 
finance, adjusted for GDP, between the same range of countries. These data are 
sufficient to raise some intriguing puzzles. Why is early-stage investment made 
at such a lower rate in countries like the UK than in the US, or indeed in other 
European countries? And why have these differences changed over time?  
 
III. How Might Law Affect the Incidence of Venture Capital Finance? 
 
We now turn to consideration of a range of different legal rules which may 
affect either the supply of (investors’ willingness to provide funds) or the 
demand for (entrepreneurs’ willingness to develop new projects) early-stage 
venture capital finance. We begin with the most obvious—taxes and subsidies—
and then look at the regulation of pension funds,  organisational law, labour law 
and finally insolvency law. In each case, hypotheses are established, relevant 
empirical literature is reviewed, and the position in the UK is considered. 
 
A. Taxes and Subsidies 
 
The use of tax incentives or subsidies to stimulate venture capital investment is 
very topical, as it features centrally in many countries’ policies towards 
fostering entrepreneurship. Clearly, these incentives could operate either at the 
supply or the demand side.  
 
1.  Capital Gains Tax.  
Lower rates of capital gains tax could be expected to stimulate either or both the 
supply of venture capital and its demand, by increasing the returns to both 
investors and entrepreneurs. Mason and Harrison (2000) conducted a 
questionnaire study of UK angel investors, and concluded that CGT was a high-
order factor influencing their decision-making about investments. The 
usefulness of  these findings is diminished by the fact that they necessarily do 
not include extramarginal investors. Conversely, Gompers and Lerner (2000), in 
their study of fundraising by US venture capitalists from 1972 through to 1994, 
found that reductions in the rate of CGT increased the level of venture capital 
funds raised both at state, industry and firm level.
4  However, the changes in 
CGT did not, as one might expect if the effect were supply-side driven, result in 
relatively greater commitments of funds from taxable as opposed to tax-exempt 
investors. Rather, all investors put up proportionately more. This led Gompers 
and Lerner to conclude that the primary impact of capital gains tax was felt not 
by investors, but by potential entrepreneurs.  
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In the UK, CGT was modified in 1998 through the introduction of ‘taper relief’ 
for assets held for more than a certain number of years, the scope of which was 
broadened in 2000. For ‘business assets’ held for four years or more, the 
applicable rate of CGT for higher-rate taxpayers falls from 40% to 10%.
5 All 
shares in unquoted trading companies are classed as business assets. For quoted 
trading companies, shares held by employees are classed as business assets, as 
are shares held by outside investors comprising more than 5% of the company’s 
share capital (Inland Revenue, 2001a: 34-55). This relief can be expected to 
stimulate both supply and demand for venture capital finance, as it reduces the 
CGT payable both by outside investors and entrepreneurs. The extension of 
relief to quoted companies is important, as it ensures that exits after an IPO are 
not penalised.  
 
2. Subsidies.   
Many countries have sought to stimulate investment in venture capital through 
granting subsidies. These can take various forms, ranging across a spectrum 
from targeted tax reliefs to investors in venture capital funds, through 
‘partnership’ funds which are partially state-funded and raise private investment 
as well, and which invest in specific types of firm, to tax relief on stock options 
and finally direct state investment in high-technology enterprise. We would 
expect investment tax relief primarily to stimulate supply of finance, direct 
subsidies and tax relief on stock options to stimulate demand, and ‘partnership’ 
funds to do both. 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that appropriately-designed subsidy schemes can 
stimulate the provision of venture capital finance. For example, the US Small 
Business Investment Company (SBIC) scheme, a federally-guaranteed risk 
capital form in operation from 1958-1969, led to the provision of more than 
$3bn to small firms, more than three times the money that was privately 
provided during this period. Furthermore, the more recent Small Business 
Innovation Research programme (SBIR), in operation from 1983 to 1995, 
provided as much funding for small, high-technology companies in 1995 as the 
entire private supply of early-stage venture capital in that year (Lerner, 1996:2). 
 
However, careful setting of the eligibility criteria is necessary. The problems of 
failure to do so are illustrated by the Business Expansion Scheme (BES) set up 
by the UK government during the 1980s. This gave tax relief on investments in 
unquoted companies, but had criteria which were too widely-drawn to prevent 
substantial abuse, and little funds were actually raised for the benefit of small 
high-risk companies at which the scheme was originally aimed (DTI, 1999: 30).  
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A less obvious problem is that inappropriately-targeted subsidised schemes may 
‘crowd out’ the private provision of funds. In Canada, Cumming and MacIntosh 
(2001) provide evidence that the introduction of legislation setting up subsidised 
Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) actually led to an 
overall reduction of the supply of venture capital funds. One possible cause is 
that the LSVCCs’ cheaper cost of capital and readily-available funds meant that 
the valuations attributed to private equity investments were driven up, making 
returns unattractive to private funds. 
 
Another important criterion for assessment is whether the schemes produce 
good returns. Subsidies are not well spent on funding poor projects. Over the 
years, various German subsidy schemes have produced very poor investments. 
Becker and Hellman (2000) present a fascinating case study of the first German 
venture capital fund, the WFG. Inexperienced managers and fears by bank co-
investors that the fund might become a competitor for their small firm business 
led to the adoption of very poor contractual protection mechanisms, and the 
WFG’s average internal rate of return was –25%. Even today, Bascha and Walz 
(2001) document that German public-private partnership funds do not make use 
of such sophisticated contractual protection as their purely private counterparts.  
 
In contrast, Lerner (1996) provides evidence that investee firms of the publicly-
funded SBIR programme experienced greater long-run growth (measured in 
terms of sales and employee numbers) than matching firms which did not 
receive such investment. Interestingly, however, this outperformance was 
limited to investee firms which were located in areas where there were 
substantial levels of private venture capital investment as well. Public funds 
invested in companies in areas where venture capital investment was not already 
prominent did not produce returns better than matched firms in those areas. 
 
A range of tax incentives specifically targeted at venture capital are on offer in 
the UK. The Venture Capital Trust (VCT) form, introduced in 1993, offers 
investors relief from both income and capital gains tax on funds invested for 
more than 5 years.
6 In 1994, the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) was 
introduced, providing extensive tax reliefs to encourage individuals to invest in 
ordinary shares in small, high-risk unquoted companies.
7 The recently-launched 
Enterprise Fund employs the ‘partnership fund’ model (Bank of England, 2001: 
67-68). Its first element is the UK High Technology Fund, which invests in 
venture capital funds that specialise in providing early-stage finance to high-
technology firms. The second element consists of Regional Venture Capital 
Funds set up throughout England to specialise in the provision of small-scale 
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equity finance to local firms. In each case, the funds invested are only partially 
public money, with the majority being privately sourced.  
 
Similarly, the granting of tax relief towards stock options, which as we have 
seen are widely used as a means of incentivising employees, has been used in an 
attempt to stimulate demand for venture capital finance. The Finance Act 1984 
provided that stock options would not be subject to income tax provided they 
were held for a specified period, and if held as part of a formal scheme, would 
create no CGT liability until exercise. A further scheme known as the 
‘Enterprise Management Initiative’ (EMI) was introduced in 1999. This allowed 
‘small, high-risk’ firms to offer options to employees which not only incur no 
income tax liability, but also incur no CGT liability on their exercise, deferring 
this until the sale of the shares. Furthermore, the four-year holding period for 
taper relief under CGT is deemed to start at the time of grant, rather than 
exercise, of the options. The scheme was extended in 2000 to allow an 
individual company to grant options within the scheme to employees to 
purchase shares up to a total value of £3m (at the time of grant) (Inland 
Revenue, 2001b).  
 
B.  Regulation of Institutional Investment: The Case of Pension Funds 
 
Much of the finance raised by venture capitalists in the US and UK comes from 
pension funds, insurance companies and other collective investment 
mechanisms. The simple theory here is that regulations which inhibit fund 
managers from investing in ‘high risk’ asset classes such as private equity and 
venture capital may hinder supply in economies where a large amount of private 
wealth is tied up in such schemes. 
 
The effect of pension regulation on venture capital investment in the US has 
been documented by Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2000). They point to a 
dramatic rise in fundraising and disbursements by venture capital firms which 
followed the liberalisation of the law. Under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (‘ERISA’), pension fund trustees are required to select investments 
according to the standard which a ‘prudent man’ would apply. It was once 
thought that certain asset classes—such as private equity—were inherently too 
risky to be within the rule. However, in 1979 the US Department of Labor 
explicitly clarified that private equity could fall within the prudent man rule.
8 
Over the next three years, there was a huge upsurge in venture capital 
fundraising, and a much greater proportion came from pension funds. Gompers 
and Lerner (2000) demonstrate a significant link between the liberalisation of 
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the ERISA rules and the supply of venture capital finance, which is robust to 
controls for a range of other possible influencing factors.
9 
 
During the late 1990s, there was an absolute decline in private equity 
investment by UK pension funds. (Myners, 2001, pp. 174-5). Thus by 1999, 
only 0.5% of the assets under management by UK pension funds were held in 
private equity, compared with 6.6% of US funds. Could the regulation of 
institutional investment in the UK be a hindrance to the supply of venture 
capital finance? This issue was considered in a recent Treasury-commissioned 
review of institutional investment conducted by Paul Myners (‘The Myners 
Review, 2001), which concluded that inappropriately-designed pension 
regulation could well be impeding inflows of capital to UK private equity.  
 
There have been significant reforms in UK pension regulation in recent years. 
The Maxwell affair and related scandals in the early 1990s led to the enactment 
of the Pensions Act 1995, which was designed to tighten safeguards for pension 
fund beneficiaries. One such mechanism was the introduction of a ‘minimum 
funding requirement’ (MFR) for defined-benefit pension schemes. This was 
designed to ensure that pension funds remained adequately capitalised, 
protecting employees against the risk of their employer’s insolvency and the 
risk of gross mismanagement by their fund trustees. It operates by requiring that 
current assets of the fund (marked to market value) exceed liabilities by a 
defined margin. Clearly, with long-term obligations such as pensions the way in 
which future liabilities are discounted to present value is crucial.  
 
The MFR links liability valuations to the rates of returns on a specific portfolio 
of assets.
10 Unfortunately this creates an additional risk for pension fund 
managers who invest in assets outside these classes—that of ‘mismatch’ 
between prevailing rates of return on their assets and the ‘MFR portfolio’ rates 
which will be used to discount their liabilities. The Myners Review concluded 
that this had tended to bias decisions about ‘asset classes’ in favour of those 
which were included within the MFR portfolio, leading to underinvestment in 
venture capital. 
 
The Myners Review recommended the abolition of the MFR, a proposal which 
had already found favour with government. A consultation paper published by 
the Department of Work and Pensions in September 2001, The Minimum 
Funding Requirement: The Next Stage of Reform, explains plans to scrap the 
MFR.  Also recommended by Myners was the introduction of a Cadbury-style 
‘voluntary’ regime of transparency and disclosure, with pension trustees being 
required annually to explain asset allocation decisions, or give reasons for not so 
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doing. It was argued that this would generate more communication between 
managers and trustees on this issue, and also encourage trustees to think more in 
absolute terms about the assessment of managers’ performance. 
 
However, the problem may be reincarnated as the new Financial Reporting 
Standard (FRS 17) which is to be introduced for the compilation of pension 
fund balance sheets. Again, this creates a possibility of ‘mismatch risk’ because 
assets are marked-to-market, whereas liabilities are discounted using a reference 
portfolio—in this case the yield on AA-grade bonds. It is thought that this will 
stimulate demand for bonds and further depress the supply of pension fund 
money into venture capital. 
 
Pension reform is also on the EU’s legislative agenda, under the twin guises of 
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and the Risk Capital Action Plan 
(RCAP). Under the RCAP, the European Commission is seeking to promote 
investment in, and employment and growth by, high-tech SMEs throughout 
Europe. A key facet of the strategy is linked to the FSAP: the liberalisation of 
pension fund rules will, it is hoped, facilitate the supply of funds into venture 
capital finance. The FSAP, in a bid to enhance the performance of European 
pension funds, proposes to introduce a pan-European standard of prudential 
pension regulation based on a ‘prudent person’ standard. Under this approach, 
the trustee is given discretion to select the appropriate mix of investments, 
according to the standard of prudence, based upon requirements of risk and 
return, liquidity etc, specific to the fund in question (European Commission, 
2000b). At present, many European countries mandate that pension trustees 
invest according to quantitative lists defining the mix of investments which 
trustees must make. However, historical returns on pension assets in countries 
adopting the prudent person standard have been much higher than those in other 
European jurisdictions which have adopted a quantitative list approach 
(Bolkestein, 2000).  
 
The introduction of a pan-European prudent person standard would undoubtedly 
increase the supply of funds available for investment in VC. In many 
jurisdictions, pension trustees are simply prohibited by the scope of the ‘legal 
list’ according to which they must invest from putting funds into risk capital. 
Under the proposed reforms, this would be legitimate—even desirable—
provided that the overall portfolio balance of risk and returns was appropriate. 
However, the reforms may yet be modified in a way which will be much less 
likely to stimulate the supply of VC finance. Following dissent from various 
Member States whose prudential pension regulation schemes currently adopt a 
quantitative approach, the Spanish Presidency has suggested that a compromise 
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standard, dubbed ‘prudent person plus’ might be adopted instead. Whilst the 
details of the proposal have not been made clear, the fear is that it may involve 
quantitative restrictions of some type, especially on the level of high-risk 
investments, such as venture capital and private equity. Because of the pan-
European effect of any Directive, this would be binding on the UK and 
therefore might amount to a net retrograde step from the current position 
(Financial Times, 2002). 
 
C. Organizational Law 
 
Organisational law may affect the incidence of venture capital finance on both 
the supply and the demand side. On the supply-side, the impact will be felt 
through the design of business organisations used by venture capitalists to 
structure their funds. On the demand side, it will be through the organisational 
structures available to entrepreneurs seeking to incorporate their businesses.  
 
1. Supply Side: Limited Partnerships 
The standard organizational form used by venture capitalists in the US is the 
limited partnership (Gompers and Lerner, 1999: 9-10). The venture capitalist 
himself is a general partner, and is exposed to unlimited personal liability, 
whereas the end-investors are limited partners. This structure is typically 
adopted because of its tax transparency: profits are for tax purposes allowed to 
‘pass through’ the partnership and are taxed as income in the hands of the end-
investors. This allows tax-exempt investors such as pension funds to invest 
alongside others, without losing their privileged status. In order to minimise the 
costs of conflicts of interest between venture capitalists and end-investors, their 
action space is usually circumscribed by a range of covenants, for example 
restricting the size of any investment in a given firm, restricting co-investment 
in portfolio companies by general partners and restricting the fund from 
investing in particular types of firm (Gompers and Lerner, 1999: 29-55). If it is 
difficult to employ an organisational form which allows for ‘pass-through’ 
taxation, then we might expect this to have a negative impact on the supply of 
venture capital finance, at least by tax-exempt investors.  
 
In the UK, the limited partnership vehicle has also become an important form of 
organisation for venture capitalists (Myners, 2001). They are structured under 
the Limited Partnerships Act 1907. There are two key problems under the 
current law. Firstly, the maximum number of partners is limited to 20.
11  This 
prevents risk-sharing amongst more than 20 investors, forcing parties to set up 
parallel partnerships which add to organisational complexity (DTI, 2001b: 4). 
The rule was introduced by the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 in order to 
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‘channel’ parties towards incorporation by registration, because of the 
procedural difficulties encountered in suing a large partnership at the time. 
Procedural developments in the interim mean that partnerships can now sue and 
be sued in their own name, and so this rationale no longer exists. The DTI 
consulted on the removal of the limit in 2001 (DTI, 2001a), and the government 
have announced their intention to abolish it (DTI, 2001c).
12   
 
Second, the 1907 Act provides that limited partners shall lose the benefit of 
limited liability if they take part in the management of the partnership 
business.
13 The Act thus envisages limited partners as purely passive 
contributors of capital. According to the Myners review (Myners, 2001: 168), 
this can create problems in practice as end-investors usually want some degree 
of oversight of the business. The 1907 Act does allow for limited partners to 
inspect the books and ‘examine into the state and prospects of the partnership 
business and … advise with the partners thereon.’ However, its precise scope is 
unclear, particularly as to whether a distinction should be drawn between 
‘advice’ and veto power exercised in respect of covenants.  
 
The structure of limited partnership law is currently under review by the Law 
Commission. Their recent consultation paper (Law Commission, 2001) has 
proposed the introduction of ‘safe harbour’ provisions along the lines of those 
found in Delaware and Jersey limited partnership statutes, which would make it 
clear that specified actions do not constitute participation in management. Under 
the proposed rule, participation in ‘extraordinary’ business decisions would not 
result in a loss of limited status.
14 Activities falling into this category would be 
further clarified by the ‘safe harbour’ list, as including: consulting and advising 
a general partner on the limited partnership business; investigating or approving 
accounts; being an employee of the firm or of its general partner; or voting on 
‘fundamental’ business decisions such as an amendment to partnership deed, a 
change in nature of business activities, conflict of interest transactions between 
general and limited partners, and resolutions to wind up the partnership. 
 
2. Supply Side: Private Companies 
Organisational law may also affect venture capital investment at the level of the 
investee company. Where legal entity structures are excessively rigid and do not 
adequately facilitate contracting with a concentrated investor—such as a venture 
capitalist—over rights to returns and control in the manner discussed in the 
preceding sections, this will make the investment less attractive. Although little 
empirical work has been done on the extent to which these issues do in fact 
impede venture capital investment, it is possible to identify some key concerns 
in the theoretical literature. 
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First, it must be possible for parties to customise corporate constitutions. 
Vermeulen (2001) documents the problems which Dutch law’s mandatory terms 
concerning the corporate constitution would create for a US-style venture 
capital contract. Secondly, the legal treatment of shareholder remedies is 
crucial. On the one hand, expressly-bargained for rights—for example, those 
held by the VC—should be afforded adequate protection from opportunistic acts 
which seek subsequently to dilute them (Bratton, 2002). On the other hand, the 
too-ready availability of a ‘minority oppression’ remedy in circumstances other 
than where parties have expressly bargained for protection can serve to 
undermine the investment process, by undermining non-legal governance 
mechanisms to which the parties might otherwise turn (Rock and Wachter, 
1999). Thirdly, if an IPO is desired as an exit mechanism, organisational law 
should not place impediments in the way of the firm’s subsequent listing. In the 
US, it is common for start-up firms to make use of the public corporation form, 
notwithstanding that these are less flexible than forms designed specifically for 
small businesses, such as partnerships and LLCs (Bankman, 1994). It is thought 
that this is due first to investors’ greater familiarity with the public company 
statutes, and secondly to certain tax advantages which are available to 
corporations but which are not to other entities—for example, the relief on CGT 
granted to holders of ‘small business stock’ (Steel, undated).
15  
 
In the UK, a range of mandatory rules of company law may create difficulties 
for venture capitalists. For example, directors’ mandatory fiduciary duties to act 
in the best interests of the company may hinder a venture capitalist’s nominees 
from exercising their governance function in situations of partisan conflict 
between the interests of the venture capitalist and of the founders.
16 This duty, 
which will be breached if consideration is only given to the interests of their 
venture capitalist appointee, cannot be modified through the terms of the articles 
of association.
17 Comben and Wilkinson (2000: 172), authors of a practitioner 
manual on the drafting of shareholder agreements, state that the common 
understandings of parties are usually that a nominee director will act in the 
interests of his appointer, such that there is a ‘considerable divergence between 
the law and the practical reality’.  
 
Similarly, the ‘maintenance of capital’ principle, in its statutory incarnation, 
prohibits a shareholder from claiming damages from the company for breach of 
a promise to redeem shares, and make such promises unenforceable by specific 
performance unless the company is able to pay for the repurchase out of 
distributable profits.
18 This makes it impossible to replicate the term frequently 
found in US investment agreements whereby the venture capitalist has the right 
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to ‘put’ his shares to the firm—in effect, the ability to bring about its liquidation 
on demand. That said, it is possible for the venture capitalist to contract for 
liquidation rights by other means—as, for example, through ‘exploding votes’ 
in a winding-up resolution,
19 or through a voting agreement under which the 




3. Demand Side: The Accessibility of Corporate Forms to Entrepreneurs 
To the extent that the organisational law of a jurisdiction hinders incorporation 
by small firms, it may restrict the demand for venture capital finance. We would 
expect that the availability of a limited liability business entity at minimal cost 
will be a primary concern for entrepreneurs, a point that is borne out by 
empirical studies which show that limited liability is a primary motivation for 
incorporation by very small businesses.
21 Furthermore, entrepreneurs will wish  
to be able to operate such an entity with minimum regulatory costs, such as 
requirements that they perform a costly annual audit. As documented by 
Djankov et al (2000), the costs of forming an incorporated business entity vary 
widely across jurisdictions. Although these authors do not test for this, it might 
be anticipated that in states where incorporation is easy, demand for venture 
capital finance would be strongest. However, Djankov et al (2000) indicate that, 
whilst involving more red tape than some jurisdictions (most notably Canada), 
the UK is still one of the easiest places in the world to incorporate a business, 
taking into account all of the regulatory measures which must be complied with. 
 
English company law appears relatively attractive to the entrepreneurial 
business. A potential problem in many European jurisdictions is the incidence 
of rules mandating a minimum share capital prior to incorporation, often 
coupled with a ban on payment for shares other than in cash, or with a 
requirement for costly valuation of non-cash consideration. This may make it 
more difficult for a wealth-constrained entrepreneur to establish a limited 
company at the pre-funding stage. Fortunately, UK company law contains no 
minimum capital requirement for private companies, and provides no 
impediment to the issue of shares in exchange for non-cash consideration to be 
supplied by an entrepreneur. Similarly, the approach of English courts to all 
questions involving the ‘corporate veil’ has been to ensure it remains as 
impermeable as possible. 
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D. Labour Law 
 
It is arguable that labour law may have an impact on the demand-side of the 
venture capital market. This could operate in a number of ways. On the one 
hand, extensive redundancy entitlements designed either to insure employees 
against the risk of redundancy, or to protect their investments in firm-specific 
human capital against employer opportunism may hamper a start-up firm’s 
ability to recruit staff (Black and Gilson, 1999). If the business is extremely 
risky, then the potential cost of employee redundancy entitlements will have to 
be taken into account in hiring decisions—it will not be enough simply to offer 
employees stock in the firm and thereby allow them to bear the risk themselves. 
Credence is given to this account by Jeng and Wells (2000) finding in their 
cross-country study of the determinants of venture capital finance, that labour 
market rigidities were negatively correlated with venture capital investment. 
The study used employee mobility as a proxy for labour market rigidities, and 
so is not a perfect test of the hypothesis considered above. Further qualitative 
work is necessary to establish what link, if any, exists in practice. 
 
Another way in which labour law might hamper demand for start-ups is 
suggested by Gilson (1999). He argues that a key factor in the relative success 
of the Silicon Valley ‘cluster’ over the earlier-established ‘Route 128’ corridor 
is the difference in the willingness of courts in each jurisdiction to enforce 
covenants not to compete. In California, such covenants are routinely not 
enforced. This might at first glance seem detrimental to the success of a 
region—surely it would enhance concerns about the appropriation of new 
technologies by competitors, and reduce willingness to invest in their 
development? This is conceded by Gilson, who counter-argues that such losses 
must be offset against gains in second-stage agglomeration economies—the 
facilitation of the transfer of new information throughout players in the region. 
Provided that departing employees remain in the region, going to another local 
firm, and that traffic is multi-lateral, then firms can expect on average to recoup 
such losses. Furthermore, the benefits in information transfer may allow new 
discoveries to be exploited much more rapidly, and in different ways, than in a 
jurisdiction where covenants to compete are rigidly enforced. 
 
E. Insolvency Law 
 
The possible impact of insolvency law on the incidence of venture capital 
finance is not something which has been explored in the literature in any 
sustained way. The  insolvency literature has, until very recently, tended to 
focus on the case of publicly-traded firms, and has only just begun to focus on 
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the incentives the law offers to those running small businesses. This section will 
argue, perhaps counter-intuitively, that personal insolvency law is likely to have 
a more important impact on the incidence of venture capital finance than 
corporate insolvency law. 
 
1. Supply Side: Corporate Insolvency Law 
Much has been written elsewhere about the differences between ‘creditor 
friendly’ and ‘debtor friendly’ corporate insolvency laws. An intriguing 
argument which may repay closer consideration is that a ‘debtor friendly’ 
corporate insolvency law may be able to increase the supply of venture capital 
finance.  
 
An important difference is whether or not the corporate insolvency law 
promotes adherence to the so-called ‘absolute priority rule’ (APR): namely that 
the priorities of payments agreed between investors should be respected in the 
making of distributions in insolvency proceedings. Almost all corporate 
insolvency regimes involve some amount of divergence from this. The most 
obvious is the elevation of certain types of claimant to ‘preferred’ status, such as 
employees and tax claims. Additionally, insolvency laws may distribute wealth 
away from secured creditors, by restricting their rights to enforce against their 
collateral. More fundamentally, however, under some systems it is possible for 
shareholders to receive payments even if the creditors are not paid in full. 
 
An example of a system where this type of breach of the APR occurs routinely 
is Chapter 11 reorganisation in the US. Under this procedure, creditors and the 
debtor engage in a form of structured bargaining over a plan of reorganisation. 
When the plan is confirmed by the court, the debtor emerges from Chapter 11 
proceedings and the parties’ pre-confirmation claims are extinguished and 
replaced with the claims against the firm detailed in the plan. Typically, 
creditors will agree to accept payment of less, and later, than they had originally 
contracted for. If the APR were respected, then we would expect shareholders 
not to receive any payment under these plans where the firm’s assets are worth 
less than its liabilities. Yet empirical studies have confirmed that it is normal for 
the old shareholders to receive claims in the reorganised firm—worth 
somewhere in the region of 5% of its market value—notwithstanding that the 
creditors are receiving claims that are worth less than their outstanding debts.
22 
Insolvency scholars believe this outcome occurs in the US because of the way 
the law is structured so as to give considerable bargaining leverage to the 
debtor.  
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By contrast, in a ‘creditor-friendly’ jurisdiction such as the UK, there is no 
question of the law facilitating such outcomes. Creditors are firmly in control of 
insolvency proceedings, and the only way in which the shareholders will retain 
any claim on a reorganised firm is if the creditors consider they are contributing 
value to it, e.g. through their human capital. We would think that, ceteris 
paribus,  breaches of the APR would make debt investment ex ante less 
desirable, and equity more desirable. Might this therefore have the effect of 
stimulating venture capital finance for high-risk, high-growth firms? 
 
This argument encounters an important objection. Reorganisation law is likely 
to be less relevant for ‘start-up’ firms than for others. Consider that if the 
venture capitalist decides not to continue funding the firm, then it is unlikely to 
be able to obtain finance from elsewhere. The fact that the venture capitalist, an 
insider with knowledge about the project, has decided it is not going to succeed, 
will send a clear signal to potential alternative funders which will deter them 
from investing. For the same reasons, a sale of the business as a going concern 
in insolvency will not be feasible. So what will be left? Given that there will be 
few liquid assets, there is unlikely to be much to fight over at all (Gilson & 
Schizer, 2002; see also Gebhard, 2000; Corcoran, 2002). On this view, 
therefore, the priorities of distribution directed by insolvency law are largely 
irrelevant: there is nothing to distribute.
23  
 
A second dimension on which corporate insolvency laws vary is the legal 
consequences of firm failure for executives. In the UK, managers of insolvent 
firms may face personal liability for ‘wrongful trading’ if a court considers that, 
from the point in time when they should have realised that the company had no 
reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, they did not take every 
reasonable step that they might to protect the interests of creditors. This liability 
may be incurred not only by those who are in fact directors of the company, but 
also by ‘shadow directors’: those in accordance with whose instructions the 
board of directors habitually act. Similarly, directors (and shadow directors) 
whose companies go into insolvency proceedings will find that their conduct is 
investigated, and they may be disqualified by the court from participating in the 
management of companies for a period of 3 to 15 years if their conduct is found 
to have been such as to make them ‘unfit’ to act as directors. Similar penalties 
for those in control of companies which become insolvent do not exist under US 
corporate insolvency law. It might be thought that these extra penalties could 
serve as a deterrent to venture capital investment.   
 
A problem with the application of the UK regime is that it depends on the 
ability of the court to decide appropriately as to the managers’ conduct. When 
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business decisions are judged with hindsight, it may be all too easy for a court 
to conclude that a director should have realised that insolvency was inevitable, 
and should have done more to protect the interests of creditors. Thus the venture 
capitalist’s nominees, who sit as board members in portfolio firms, or the VCs 
themselves—who in certain circumstances may constitute themselves ‘shadow 
directors’—may fear that an inappropriate court decision will lead to the 
imposition of liability or disqualification. Might this be a factor which would 
inhibit the supply of venture capital finance at the margin? 
 
This second apparent comparative disadvantage to investment in UK start-up 
companies also vanishes on closer inspection. First, a legal comparison that 
looks solely at ‘insolvency law’ may be misleading. Directors in other 
jurisdictions may owe duties to creditors which arise from corporate law, once 
their firm becomes insolvent.
24 As a result, they too may face personal liability 
to contribute to the insolvent company’s assets if they do not act sufficiently in 
the interests of creditors.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, the structure of the venture capitalist’s 
incentives under the investment agreement are likely to mean that there is little 
chance of any tardiness in bringing about liquidation. Recall that the venture 
capitalist typically has preferred shares. These will allow him to rank ahead of 
the entrepreneur for the purposes of repayment of capital in a liquidation, if 
there is any money left over after creditors have been paid. Thus, as soon as the 
venture capitalist decides that the company is not going to be a success, he will 
have an incentive to liquidate it as soon as possible so as to maximise his 
chances of getting something back. A court would be most unlikely to seek to 
second-guess the decision of a venture capitalist as to whether the firm is likely 
to prosper: not only does the venture capitalist have greater expertise than the 
court, but the sincerity of his belief is credibly demonstrated by his willingness 
to invest funds.  
  
2.  Demand Side: Personal Insolvency Law 
So far, we have argued that it unlikely that the structure of a country’s corporate 
insolvency law will have a significant impact on the supply of venture capital 
finance in that jurisdiction. By contrast, personal insolvency law may be a much 
more important factor than would seem apparent at first blush. Superficially, we 
may point to the limited liability which incorporation of the business will 
generate for entrepreneurs. Of course, it is possible to ‘contract out’ of limited 
liability through the grant by shareholders of  personal guarantees of business 
indebtedness. Such guarantees are indeed demanded as a matter of course by 
banks lending to small firms (Freedman and Godwin, 1994). Yet for start-up 
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companies without major debt investors, such guarantees may not be so 
prevalent. To see the possible relationship between venture capital finance and 
personal insolvency, it is necessary to consider the process of business 
initiation. 
 
Imagine a putative entrepreneur who is considering starting a firm. He will not 
be able to obtain venture capital finance until a reasonably advanced stage of 
development. To begin with, he will likely seek investment from family and 
friends, and run up credit card debt. When these sources are exhausted, he may 
seek ‘angel’ finance, and only by the time he has a defined business plan and a 
reasonably well-developed technology will the firm become an attractive 
proposition to VCs. From here on, let us focus on three broad sectors of 
outcome. First, he might not succeed in raising venture capital finance. In this 
case, it is quite possible that he will have over-extended his personal finances to 
reach this point, and will face personal insolvency. Second, he may raise 
venture capital finance and the firm subsequently prospers. In this case, his 
personal debt load will be paid off. Third, he may raise venture capital finance 
and the firm subsequently fails. Whilst in the interim he may have received 
salary from the firm, it is still quite possible that he is so over-extended that the 
collapse of the firm will precipitate personal insolvency as well. Thus in the first 
and third cases, the content of personal insolvency law will matter a great deal 
to the entrepreneur. Ex ante, at the point in time immediately before our story 
starts, the putative entrepreneur will have made a decision to go into business on 
his own. One factor in this decision will be the potential ‘downside’ 
consequences if scenarios one or three eventuate.
25  
 
If personal insolvency law imposes harsh consequences upon the individual, 
then ex ante the attractiveness of entering into a risky entrepreneurial endeavour 
will be reduced, particularly if the individual is risk-averse. This theory would 
predict that a harsher personal insolvency law should be related to a reduced 
demand for venture capital finance, as less entrepreneurs are willing to initiative 
high-risk businesses. 
 
An initial test of this theory might be to compare the personal insolvency laws 
of the UK and US, two jurisdictions with readily accessible legal materials. In 
the UK, the estate of the bankrupt, minus certain exemptions, is taken over by a 
trustee and sold for the benefit of his creditors (Fletcher, 1996). The exemptions 
include items for the bankrupt’s personal use in employment and clothing and 
household items required for his basic domestic needs and those of his family. 
The bankrupt is then subject to certain legal disabilities for a three-year period,
26 
including an inability to incur credit of more than £250 without disclosing his 
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status as a bankrupt, a ban on trading under a different name without disclosing 
the name under which he was declared bankrupt, and being disqualified from 
participating in the management of a limited liability company.
27 During this 
time, the whole of the bankrupt’s income apart from a very modest living 
allowance must be transferred to the trustee for the benefit of his creditors. At 




This position may be contrasted with that which obtains in the US (Tabb, 1997). 
An individual debtor may opt either to enter bankruptcy proceedings under 
either Chapter 7, Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 of the federal code. Chapter 7, the 
most frequently used, normally provides a debtor with an immediate automatic 
discharge from most of his debts, in return for handing over all of his non-
exempt assets for the benefit of creditors.
29 From this point onwards, no creditor 
may seek to collect pre-bankruptcy debts from the debtor, and the debtor may 
keep the proceeds of any subsequent earnings.
30 There is no specified period 
during which the debtor is subject to legal disabilities, and proceedings typically 
take around 3-4 months to finalise. Indeed, the bankruptcy code specifically 
protects debtors from any discriminatory treatment on account of the fact that 
they have filed for bankruptcy.
31 The range of property which is exempt from 
the bankrupt estate is largely defined by reference to the state in which the 
debtor has been domiciled for the 180 days preceding the filing.
32 The level of 
exemptions varies widely, the most notoriously generous being the ‘homestead’ 
exemptions under Florida and Texas law, which allow the debtor to retain an 
interest in his home of unlimited value. However, in some other states, such as 




Given that UK personal insolvency law is considerably stricter than its US 
counterpart, we might expect that this would lead to a reduced demand for 
venture capital finance, particularly amongst start-up firms. The data on 
comparative incidence of venture capital appear to bear this out. Further, albeit 
indirect, support for this hypothesis comes from a recent study by Fan and 
White (2000). This found a significant correlation between incidence of owner-
managed businesses and the total value of property which might be exempted 
from bankruptcy under state law in the US.   
 
The UK’s Enterprise Bill 2002 contains a number of features designed to reduce 
the harshness of personal insolvency for individuals who have become bankrupt 
simply because of bad luck, as opposed to irresponsible risk-taking on their part. 
Under the new legislation, the time to automatic discharge will be reduced to 12 
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months, although if fraud is shown then the bankrupt may be made subject to a 
Bankruptcy Restraining Order which will, inter alia, prohibit him from being 
involved in the management of a company for a period of 5-15 years. 
Furthermore, the legal disabilities associated with the status of undischarged 
bankrupt will be scrapped, as a bid to send a signal to society that bankruptcy 
should carry less stigma. At the European level, the EC’s Risk Capital Action 
Plan has identified the need to facilitate the ‘softening of bankruptcy laws to 
allow failed entrepreneurs a second chance…’ (European Commission, 2000b), 
although specific proposals for reform have yet to be tabled.  
 
Ironically, proposed reforms in the US will move personal bankruptcy law in 
the opposite direction. The proposals will see the introduction of means-testing 
for debtors who wish to make use of Chapter 7 proceedings, requiring those 
whose incomes are above a certain threshold instead to make use of the Chapter 
13 procedure, which involves a composition with creditors as opposed to an 
outright discharge (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2001). The reforms will also 
restrict the ability of fraudulent debtors to rely on the homestead exemption, 
meaning that a debtor convicted of securities fraud or certain types of felony 
would be unable to shield more than $125,000 of real estate (Washington Post, 
2002). These reforms may have the effect of making entrepreneurship less 
attractive at the margins.  
 
 
IV. The Impact of Regulatory Competition 
 
The hypotheses considered in Part III all proceeded on the strong assumption 
that entrepreneurship and venture capital investing is primarily a domestic 
affair. We now relax this assumption to look at the possible impact of regulatory 
competition on venture capital investment. As a first observation, it is worth 
noting that funds for investment in venture capital flow readily across borders. 
Baygan and Freudenberg (2000) present an analysis of trade association data 
which shows the extent to which this took place in Europe during the 1990s. 
Some of their findings are replicated in Table 1. This has important implications 
for policy, suggesting that law reform efforts designed to stimulate venture 
capital finance should be directed at the demand, rather than the supply side. 
Transnational capital flows may simply bypass several of the supply-side legal 
‘barriers’ to venture capital considered in Part III. Of course, entrepreneurs are 
also able to repatriate themselves in favour of jurisdictions where demand-side 
variables are more favourable to their endeavours. Yet it seems plausible that 
the necessary differential between national legal systems so as to provoke 
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substantial movements of entrepreneurs would have to be much greater than for 
movements of funds. 
 
 
Table 1. Cross-border private equity investment flows, 1999 (% of domestic 
investments) 
 






Ireland 10  372  362 
Finland  16 76 60 
Italy 5  13  8 
Germany  17 22 5 
France  25 22 -3 
Netherlands  50 38 -12 
Belgium  54 41 -13 
UK 33  5  -28 
Source: Baygan and Freudenberg (2000) 
 
 
Consider first the case of pension fund regulation. The Myners Report itself 
notes that there was a spectacular growth in funds committed to UK venture 
capital during the second half of the 1990s—but that most of the influx was 
from abroad, particularly from US pension funds (Myners, 2001, p. 175). The 
problem with pension fund governance is therefore probably not one of 
undersupply of venture capital finance to UK firms. Rather, it is a problem for 
pension fund beneficiaries, who cannot reap the benefits of such investment. 
This view is echoed by Mayer (2001: 7), who questions whether the relatively 
low levels of venture capital investment in early-stage companies in the UK is 
not due to demand-side problems, such as the availability of entrepreneurs with 
good projects. 
 
Secondly, if a domestic law, such as that of England, creates significant barriers 
to using the Limited Partnership form for venture capital funds, then a fund may 
simply engage in ‘forum shopping’ by using a Delaware or Jersey business form 
instead. The logic of the same argument may be extended to choice of state of 
incorporation for start-up firms seeking to raise venture finance. To the extent 
that domestic organisational forms hinder their ability to contract effectively 
with VCs, they may simply opt to incorporate elsewhere, even if the business 
does not physically move (see Rock, 2001). 
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Factors which affect the demand for venture capital—i.e. those legal variables 
which may have an impact on the level of entrepreneurial activity—would 
therefore appear to be more important areas to address if policy-makers are keen 
to promote early-stage venture capital finance. In a world of global capital 
flows, demand-side factors such as capital gains tax, personal insolvency law 
and labour law (to the extent that these may be shown to affect entrepreneurial 
activity) will be more important than the more supply-side oriented factors 




This paper has reviewed theories and evidence as to the extent to which law 
‘matters’ for the provision of venture capital finance, and a central theme has 
been that it may do so in a variety of ways. Clearly, regulatory provisions may 
affect the incentives of marginal investors and entrepreneurs, thereby affecting 
the aggregate levels of venture capital investment in a country. Theoretically, a 
range of different regulatory provisions may have an impact on the incentives of 
investors to supply, or of entrepreneurs to demand, venture capital finance. The 
available empirical evidence tends to support the claims that taxes and pension 
fund regulation may be determinants of investment. The evidence as respects 
the effects, if any, of organizational law, labour law and insolvency law is still 
equivocal or non-existent, and these issues constitute important questions for 
future research. The advent of globalisation is likely to mean that law reform 
which seeks to stimulate the supply of domestic venture capital will make less 
of a difference to overall levels of investment than efforts to stimulate demand.  
 
Law may also matter for inframarginal investors, by determining the content of 
their venture capital investment agreements. Theoretical studies of the agency 
problems in financing innovation suggest that there are several different 
financial contracts which might be adequate to overcome the worst difficulties, 
but are somewhat ambivalent as to which is optimal. As we have seen in Part I, 
it appears that US tax law may be a reason for US venture capitalists’ 
propensity to take convertible preferred stock in their American investee 
companies—but not when they invest in Canadian companies, where a different 
tax regime applies. Although the law determines the form of the contracts, the 
theoretical studies suggest there will be little effect, if any, on their optimality.   




1 For reviews of the extensive literature on venture capital investment contracts, 
see Gompers and Lerner (2001), Hart (2001) and Klausner and Litvak 
(2001). 
2 This practice, and the ethical concerns to which it gives rise, is considered in 
more detail by Puri (2001), who explains how it has now spread to other 
parts of the US, Canada and even some English firms. 
3 Bernstein (1995) offers an explanation why lawyers might have comparative 
advantage over VCs in doing this: for a VC, if screening returns a 
negative result, there is no payoff. However, for lawyers, there is a payoff 
in a wider range of cases because can match to a range of VCs. This 
explanation, however, ignores the point that a VC’s upside payoff is 
much larger than that of lawyers. 
4 Specifically, the introduction in 1993 of a relief for ‘small business stock’ 
permitted gains on shares held in qualifying corporations for more than 
fives years to be taxed at 14% instead of the standard 28% (I.R.C. § 
1202). 
5 This now compares favourably with the maximum capital gains tax rate 
applied in the US for long-term gains (ie where the asset has been held 
for more than 12 months) of 20%. However, noncorporate taxpayers may 
reduce the tax payable on gains from “small business stock” to 14%, up 
to a statutory ceiling (IRC § 1202). 
6 More specifically, an individual subscribing for up to £100,000 of shares in a 
VCT will get income tax relief at 20% on his investment, provided the 
shares are held for at least five years, and will pay not CGT on the 
disposal of his VCT shares; furthermore, the VCT itself will not be 
subject to CGT on the sale of shares it holds in investee companies (SJ 
Berwin, 1997: 5). 
7 The scheme allows an individual to invest up to £100,000 per annum in 
unquoted companies, and provided that they are held for more than 5 
years, will confer income tax relief at 20% on those investments and 
exempt disposals from CGT (SJ Berwin, 1997: 6). 
8 Provided that a fund’s portfolio is appropriately diversified, and consideration 
is paid to the risk-reward profile of a particular investment class, then 
‘riskiness’ per se is not a reason to make investment imprudent. 
9 Jeng and Wells (2000) did not find any correlation between the size of the 
pension funds under management in a particular country and the levels of 
VC finance. This is not, however, surprising, as the study did not control 
for differing regulation of pension funds in different jurisdictions. 
10 Under the MFR, liabilities to current pensioners are discounted by the current 
rate of gilts, and liabilities to current employees are discounted at the  
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current rate for equities for their projected remaining time in 
employment, and at the rate for gilts for the expected period for which 
they will be pension recipients. 
11 Companies Act 1985 s 716; Limited Partnerships Act 1907 s 4(2). 
12 A special relaxation of the rule has applied from 22 March 2002 for limited 
partnership collective investment schemes authorised under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. 
13 Limited Partnerships Act 1907 s 6(1). 
14 The scope of the proposed safe harbour would draw on the distinction 
between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ business matters which is already 
found in the default management provisions of the 1907 Act (ibid. s 6(5)). 
Ordinary business decisions may be decided upon by a majority of 
general partners, it being implicit that ‘extraordinary’ decisions require 
the consent of all partners. 
15 I.R.C. § 1202. Cf. Callison (2000), who argues that the relative 
unattractiveness of the LLC form to venture capital investors is because 
of its governance attributes, which assume that every investor will be an 
active participant in all business decisions. 
16 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Meyer [1959] AC 324; Kuwait 
Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1991] AC 187. 
17 Companies Act 1985 s 310. 
18 See generally, Armour (2000: 363-370).  
19 Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099. 
20 See Russell v Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 
588. 
21 Freedman and Godwin (1994) and Hicks et al. (1995). 
22 For a review, see Armour (2001). 
23 The effect of corporate insolvency law on venture capital supply might not, 
however, be direct. If creditors fare worse in traditional manufacturing 
businesses, and shareholders fare better, then the range of industries in 
which venture capital becomes the cheapest form of outside finance may 
increase. This might have a knock-on effect of stimulating the growth of 
venture capital funds, which in turn then develop expertise sufficient to 
invest in other, more risky firms. 
24 For example, Delaware: see Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Pathe 
Communications Corp (1991 Del Ch)). 
25 It may be argued that entrepreneurs are by nature optimistic, and will have 
sufficient belief in their project to discount the risk of failure. In this case, 
the consequences of personal bankruptcy will be less important to them 
ex ante. This may well be accurate  as a description of those whose do  
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choose to become entrepreneurs, but it proves nothing about those who 
choose not to do so because of the fear of bankruptcy. 
26 The period may be reduced to two years for cases involving total debts of less 
than £20,000. 
27 There are a range of other disabilities, including being barred from sitting as a 
Member of Parliament or of the House of Lords. 
28 If the individual was previously discharged from bankruptcy less than 9 years 
beforehand, then discharge is not automatic. 
29 11 USC §§ 524, 727(a). 
30 11 USC §§ 524(a); 541(a)(6). 
31 11 USC § 525. 
32 11 USC § 522(b). The same subsection also provides a federal list of 
exemptions which the debtor may elect to apply instead of state 
exemptions (§ 522(d)), provided that his state of domicile has not 
legislated to deny its debtors this choice. Tabb (1997: 643-644) notes that 
‘as of 1997, 35 states had opted out of the federal scheme, rendering  § 
522(d) a dead letter in much of the nation’. 
33 The US bankruptcy system is not quite as reckless in its generosity to debtors 
as it at first may seem. There are a number of grounds for denying 
discharge, perhaps the most important of which is that a discharge may 
not be granted more than once every six years. Furthermore, if the court 
considers that the debtor is committing a ‘substantial abuse’ of the system 
by not filing for Chapter 13, under which a debtor enters into a repayment 
compromise with his creditors lasting three years, then he may also 
dismiss the case. Finally, a range of debts such as those incurred on the 
basis of fraud, student loans, alimony payments and certain tax claims 
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